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Abstract Fragmentalism was first introduced by Kit Fine in his ‘Tense and Reality’
(Modality and tense: philosophical papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp 261–320, 2005). According to fragmentalism, reality is an inherently perspec-
tival place that exhibits a fragmented structure. The current paper defends the
fragmentalist interpretation of the special theory of relativity, which Fine briefly
considers in his paper. The fragmentalist interpretation makes room for genuine
facts regarding absolute simultaneity, duration and length. One might worry that
positing such variant properties is a turn for the worse in terms of theoretical virtues
because such properties are not involved in physical explanations and hence theo-
retically redundant. It will be argued that this is not right: if variant properties are
indeed instantiated, they will also be involved in straightforward physical expla-
nations and hence not explanatorily redundant. Hofweber and Lange, in their ‘Fine’s
Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity’ (Nouˆs 51:871–883, 2017), object
that the fragmentalist interpretation is in tension with the right explanation of the
Lorentz transformations. It will be argued that their objection targets an inessential
aspect of the fragmentalist framework and fails to raise any serious problem for the
fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity.
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Consider some faraway place in the universe. There is no fact of the matter about
what happens there at the very moment you are reading this sentence. It is a mistake
to think that there is an objective course of time through which all current things in
the universe are progressing. It is also not the case that the things you see have
intrinsic mass, or intrinsic spatial shapes. These are some of the standardly accepted
metaphysical consequences of the special theory of relativity, captured by the
Minkowskian conception of spacetime.
The Minkowskian conception of spacetime accepts the assumption that what
varies across perspectives (such as frames of references) must be mere appearance.
This assumption is rejected by a metaphysical framework known as fragmentalism.
Fragmentalism holds that what varies across perspectives are not mere appearance
but genuine bits of reality. These perspectival facts are located in different
fragments. The view was first introduced by Fine (2005). He argues that a
fragmentalist version of tense realism is superior to more standard versions of tense
realism. In particular, Fine argues that a fragmentalist view of time is in a position to
(1) better account for the passage of time, (2) better account for the relation between
tensed talk and temporal reality, and (3) that it renders tense realism compatible
with (a fragmentalist interpretation of) the special theory of relativity.
The focus of this paper is not on the fragmentalist interpretation of special
relativity as a way of bolstering a tense realist view of time. The focus of this paper
will rather be on the interpretation of special relativity as such and explores its
worth as a self-standing view. Of course, by showing how the fragmentalist
interpretation of special relativity is independently motivated and not an ad-hoc
reinterpretation, the current paper provides further support for Fine’s overall
argument. The main aim of this paper is however to provide further clarification of
the fragmentalist approach to special relativity and to show that, though highly
nonstandard, it is of intrinsic interest, regardless of one’s views of tense realism.
Since Fine’s paper, there have been various discussions of the conceptual
foundations of fragmentalism and various alternative formulations have been
offered (see Lipman 2015; Loss 2017; Simon forthcoming). The aim of the current
paper is not concerned with the conceptual or technical aspects of fragmentalism
and I will for the most part restrict the discussion to Fine’s formulation of
fragmentalism. However, there will be one point where a difference in approach will
be relevant to our discussion.
It is also important to keep in mind that none of what follows is in any way
intended to be a criticism of the standard Minkowskian interpretation. To show how
the fragmentalist interpretation is motivated by various considerations is not the
same as showing that it is also better than the standard interpretation. These two
points should be distinguished. In my view, the question of which theory is
ultimately better will depend crucially on wider theory integration, how well each
interpretation generalizes and meshes with other scientific theories. This question
lies beyond the scope of this paper. The aim here is to show the independent interest
of the view, not its superiority.
As the main interest in fragmentalism lies within metaphysics, the paper assumes
no real background knowledge in the relevant physics and some basic matters will
be briefly explained afresh. Apologies for those who know these matters well.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The first section introduces fragmentalism. The
second section explains how a fragmentalist interpretation deals with the sorts of
scenarios that are typically invoked to illustrate how special relativity is in tension
with our more ordinary ways of thinking about space and time. After discussing the
motivations driving the fragmentalist interpretation, it will be shown how the
variant properties naturally play explanatory roles and are not merely epiphenom-
enal additions to our metaphysics. The paper will then discuss an objection against
the fragmentalist interpretation due to Hofweber and Lange (2017). They object that
fragmentalism is in tension with the right explanation of why the Lorentz
transformations hold. The final section replies to their objection.
1 Fragmentalism
Fragmentalism is the view that the world is inherently perspectival. It is standardly
assumed that whenever we are dealing with conflicting perspectival representations
of reality, there is always some kind of relativization to standpoints involved in the
underlying facts and that it is only ever representations that are properly said to be
perspectival, and not the world itself (see e.g. Moore 1997: Ch. 3). We standardly
assume that we only ever have perspectival representations of a non-perspectival
world. Fragmentalism denies this assumption, allowing that the world is itself an
inherently perspectival place where facts do not simply obtain or fail to obtain, as
we ordinarily assume, but where certain facts can obtain in the context of one set of
facts and yet fail to obtain in the context of other sets of facts.
Fine’s formulation of the view revolves around a primitive relation that he calls
coherence. The overall collection of facts, ‘u¨ber-reality’, includes pairs of mutually
incompatible facts. They are the facts that we would be tempted to describe as being
somehow ‘from conflicting perspectives’ such as obtaining ‘at different times’ or
‘within different frames of reference’. Fragmentalism denies this substitution of the
apparent facts with more relational facts and instead accepts the incompatible facts
as being all equally constitutive of the world. Instead of ‘relativizing’ facts in some
way or another, we should recognize that some of the facts cohere and some do not.
Given this set up, there are maximal coherent collections of facts, which Fine calls
the ‘fragments’. These play various theoretical roles within the fragmentalist
picture, such as playing the role of times (2005: 308–310) and playing the role of the
indices at which we evaluate the truth of ordinary utterances (2005: §9).
Fine’s characterization of fragmentalism follows his more general methodolog-
ical view that the intended formulation of many metaphysical views requires a
distinction between what is merely the case and what is in reality the case (see his
2001: §8–10, 2005: §2). What is in reality the case is expressed using a sentential
operator <(…), which is governed by various principles. A metaphysical realist
position about the fact that p should be understood, according to Fine, as the
position that it is in reality the case that p, i.e. that it is the case that <p. Tense-
realism, on this approach, becomes the claim that various tensed sentences are
embedded under the reality operator < in a correct description of reality. Which
facts are real together and which are not is expressed using the earlier mentioned
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notion of coherence. One possible view here is that two facts are real together if it is
in reality the case that they cohere. But Fine suggests that it might be possible to
understand the fragmentalist’s notion of reality in terms of coherence by assuming
that a fact is real if and only if it self-coheres (2005: 281, fn.13). This way we do not
need both the notions of reality and coherence, we can make do with the single
notion of coherence—stipulated as itself conveying the fundamental reality of
whatever it relates. To express that A and B ‘cohere’, we can just write that they are
real together, i.e. that <(A, B).
The central thesis of fragmentalism is that conflicting matters that appear to
obtain from equally good but conflicting perspectives, whether they be different
times, or some other kind of ‘perspective’, do not have to be mere appearances of an
underlying layer of compatible facts. In the case of the special theory of relativity,
we encounter a particularly striking case of conflicting facts across perspectives.
There are different possible accounts of what the relevant ‘perspectives’ are in this
context. Einstein’s (1905) so-called ‘radar’ definition of simultaneity uses a
relativization to paths of inertial motion through spacetime; but one could also
relativize to spacetime locations, or to pairs consisting of frames of references and
times, what we may call ‘frame-times’ (Fine 2005: §11). Regardless of the exact
nature of the index of relativization, these indices or ‘perspectives’ disagree about
which events succeed one another, about the duration of a given event, and the
intrinsic spatial shapes and intrinsic masses of objects. These are the so-called
variant (or ‘frame-relative’) properties of special relativity. When ‘p’ is a sentence
attributing some frame-relative property to an object or event, realism about such
properties consists—on Fine’s approach—in accepting that <p. The fragmentalist
interpretation of the special theory of relativity requires not a revision of the way we
think about space, time and their occupants, but requires rather a revision of the
metaphysical structure we attribute to reality: it takes there to be various collections
of cohering facts and, across such fragments, incompatible facts concerning the
variant properties of things. As Fine remarks, the resulting view can be pictured as
‘a plurality of physical space–times […] each of them Newtonian in structure’
(2005: 306).1 This should become clearer when we have a closer look at the
application of fragmentalism to special relativity.
1 It is worth noting that there are other possible fragmentalist interpretations of special relativity, some of
which stay much closer to the Minkowskian conception of spacetime. Stein (1968) mentions for example
the possibility of a ‘solipsist’ interpretation according to which ‘for any event, it and it alone is real’
(1968: 18). This locational view can be captured in the fragmentalist framework as the view that only the
properties of a single relativistic event all cohere. Fine (2005: 304–305) briefly argues against this view
within the context of tense-realism, pointing out that a tense-realist aims to maintain a real difference
between spatial and temporal indexicality, which is lost on this view. The following discussion is not
meant to apply to all possible fragmentalist interpretations.
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2 Fragmentalist relativity and the manifest image
The Minkowskian conception effectively rejects the reality of anything that differs
across the relativistic perspectives and only takes that which is invariant to be real.2
The result is the familiar fusion of space and time into a single spacetime, rejecting
the various properties that are based on a neat separation of space and time, such as
shape, duration, rest mass, simultaneity, and so on. These are now the ‘mere
shadows’ of reality, as Minkowski (1964/1908: 297) puts it. The relation between
the Minkowskian conception of spacetime and our more common understanding of
our spatiotemporal surrounding can be neatly conveyed through various well-known
scenarios involving different observers in relative motion to each other. To better
see how the fragmentalist framework implies a more conservative relation between
special relativity and our manifest image, it will be helpful to consider these well-
known scenarios afresh.
Imagine that you are in a space shuttle hanging still in an empty black space and
that, for as long as you remember, you have experienced your space shuttle as being
at rest. Imagine that I am in an exactly analogous situation, that is to say, I am also
in a space shuttle that, for as long as I remember, I have experienced as being at rest.
One day, we see each other’s space shuttles. You experience my space shuttle as
drifting by with a constant speed of 5 km/h towards the east, still experiencing
yourself at rest. I experience you as drifting by with a constant speed of 5 km/h
towards the west and still experience myself as being at rest. Our observations of
each other’s shuttles therefore disagree about who is moving and who is at rest: you
observe that I am moving, whereas I observe myself as being at rest.
You set up an experiment. You are standing in the exact middle of your space
shuttle (which you still observe as being at rest) and you emit some light towards
both ends of the space shuttle. You observe that the light arrives simultaneously at
the front and end of the shuttle. This is as you would expect: as you are at the middle
of a space shuttle at rest, the light has the same distance to travel in both directions
and should arrive at the same time, given that light always has the same speed
c (roughly 300,000 kilometres per second) regardless of what direction it moves in. I
am in my space shuttle, observing your experiment. From my perspective, the
beams of light also have the same velocity c as in yours. But since I observe your
shuttle as moving, the forward moving light has to travel more distance, and since it
still has the same constant speed c, arrives later than the light sent towards the back.
As before, our observations conflict. This time, our observations do not disagree
about the constant velocity of light, but about the simultaneity of the light arriving
2 Our discussion will employ only coordinate descriptions of the Minkowski spacetime instead of the
more typical geometric description of spacetime as a 4-dimensional real vector space together with a
certain metric signature (Naber 1988: 1). This characterization of the intrinsic geometric structure is not
congenial to our discussion since it has already abstracted away the perspectival representations that are
the common starting point with the fragmentalist. This paper is concerned precisely with the assumption
at play in the transition from the perspectival representations to the intrinsic structure of spacetime and so
Minkowski’s own Erlanger approach of seeing intrinsic structure as that which is invariant across
coordinatized descriptions provides a more suitable setting for our discussion.
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at, respectively, the front and back of your space shuttle: you observe them arriving
simultaneously, whereas I observe them arriving one after the other.
This sort of scenario was originally told in terms of trains (Einstein 1920: Ch. IX;
see also Einstein 1905: §A.2) and there are some complicating factors that we have
glossed over. The crucial overall point however is that there is no way whatsoever
of singling out one of the two conflicting sets of observations. Could one of us be
right? According to Newton, only one of us is indeed right. Newton took space to be
a three-dimensional spatial realm that endures through time, so that any spatial
location at one time is taken to be identical to a spatial location at a different time,
and which location is which is an entirely objective matter (Newton 1689/1934: 6).
But how can we figure out which spatial location at one time is identical to which
spatial location at a different time? It seems that we cannot tell empirically who is
right.
The different locations do not come with intrinsic qualitative differences with
which we could individuate them, telling us which point is which. The constant
velocities of objects that we observe also cannot help arbitrate our dispute, given
that our observations disagree precisely about which objects have which constant
velocity. Properties other than the observed constant velocities do not help either.
As Galileo famously showed, we cannot tell from properties other than their
constant velocity whether a given object has a certain constant velocity, since things
look exactly the same in scenarios seen from different frames of reference (Galileo
1632/1967: 186–187). In short, it does not help to appeal to the contents of our
conflicting observations because our observations agree about everything except for
the constant velocities attributed to things.
It seems we could only arbitrarily assign one of us to be the privileged observer,
without any possible empirical evidence for any particular privileging. Moving from
a Newtonian to a Minkowskian conception of spacetime eradicates the threat of
empirical arbitrariness, as the Minkowskian view eliminates precisely that about
which the different perspectival observations conflict. An important role here is
played by the Lorentz transformations (together with other transformations, such as
those governing electric fields) as they capture exactly what varies and what remains
invariant across perspectives. Lorentz transformations are coordinate transforma-
tions between two inertial coordinate frames that move at a constant velocity
relative to each other. If we only consider coordinate systems that are oriented the
same way and which are such that one moves only in the x-direction of the other
frame, the Lorentz transformations are the following (with the primed coordinates
for the moving frame):
t0 ¼ c tvx=c2 
x0 ¼ c xvtð Þ c ¼ 1v2=c2 1=2
y0 ¼ y
z0 ¼ z
The so-called spacetime interval between spacetime points is the central invariant
property that constitutes the intrinsic structure of Minkowski spacetime. It is written
M. A. Lipman
123
Ds2 and defined as follows: Ds2 = (cDt)2-Dx2-Dy2-Dz2. Here Dx, Dy, Dz, and
Dt can each be different in different Lorentz-related frames but only in such a way
that Ds2 comes out the same in each frame description (where by ‘frame description’
I mean a description of events in terms of the coordinates given by a particular
frame of reference). According to the Minkowskian interpretation, the spacetime
interval Ds2 is the only real spatiotemporal quantity, which can be broken up into
different temporal and spatial components within different coordinate representa-
tions. The different temporal and spatial components only feature within the
coordinate representations, which are now deemed to be the perspectival
representations of the underlying non-perspectival world, itself only characterized
by the spacetime interval.
The fragmentalist framework offers an alternative treatment of the shuttle
scenario. Taken at face value, we have two conflicting descriptions that, together,
imply incompatible assignments of variant properties. If we forget the Minkowski
interpretation for a moment, it is an appealing thought that variant properties are
instantiated out there. The very property of squareness studied in Euclidean
geometry is plausibly thought to be the sort of property instantiated by the objects
around me. This is how many of us understand the world in our less-guarded
moments, indeed, we even take ourselves to observe such properties (see Epstein
2018; see also Chalmers 2012: Ch. 7 on ‘Edenic squareness’). A piece of paper can
be square according to descriptions in one frame of reference and oblong according
to descriptions in another frame of reference. We expect that there is a stark
difference in what it is like to undergo an experience of a square shape and
undergoing the experience of an oblong shape, and this phenomenal difference
seems due to a difference in content: they would be experiences that attribute
different shape properties to things, the very shape properties for which there is no
place in the Minkowskian conception of the world (cf. Siegel 2010: Ch. 3).
If the Minkowskian interpretation is true, these assumptions about our
observations are controversial. If the variant properties are not instantiated out
there, then externalist considerations about the contents of perception might lead us
to think that such properties also cannot really feature in the representational
contents of our perceptions and observations (Chalmers 2012: Ch. 7). But this is just
to say that if the Minkowskian interpretation is right, we also need to revise our
ordinary assumptions about the sorts of properties that we take ourselves to observe.
The fragmentalist interpretation has appeal because it restores a simple story about
what sort of properties things have, and hence how we perceive the world to be. It
offers an alternative interpretation on which the intuitive story of the apparent
contents of our perceptual experience can be right.
Consider in a little more detail the conflicting observations we encounter in the
space shuttle scenario. I have no good independent reason to discredit your
observation, and you do not a have good independent reason to discredit my
observation. Between us, it seems that we have equally good evidence that I am at
rest as well as evidence that I have a constant velocity. In the imagined case, you
experience my space shuttle as moving and your space shuttle as being at rest; I
experience your space shuttle as moving and my shuttle being at rest. Given these
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observations, a simple fragmentalist description of the case imagined looks as
follows3:
<(your shuttle is at rest, my shuttle moves with 5 km/h to the east, the light
beams arrive at the front and back simultaneously) & <(your shuttle moves
with 5 km/h to the west, my shuttle is at rest, the light arrives at the front only
after it arrived at the back)
Neither of our observations is arbitrarily privileged according to these descriptions.
We take what we observe, namely the co-instantiation of various variant properties,
at face value. We accept that your shuttle is at rest and that your shuttle is moving
with a constant velocity; and we accept that the light arrives at the front and back
simultaneously and that it arrives at the front only after it arrived at the back. More
generally, we both observe genuine but conflicting facts concerning the simultane-
ity, duration, length and shape. The discussed sort of scenario thus offers support for
a fragmentalist conception that matches the overall pool of naı¨ve observation reports
whilst taking the content of these descriptions at face value.
One might worry that the fragmentalist picture not only opposes the
Minkowskian view but more generally opposes an instance of so-called symmetry
reasoning. The symmetries of theories, in this case the re-descriptions of facts in
different frames of reference related by the Lorentz transformations, are normally
treated as a guide to reality: we consider the variance of properties across such
frame descriptions to be a sign of their unreality (see, amongst others, Baker 2010;
Dasgupta 2016; Earman 1989; Ismael and van Fraassen 2003; and Roberts 2008).
One might worry that fragmentalism conflicts with this widely adopted method of
symmetry reasoning. But this is not quite right. The relevant descriptions in cases of
symmetry reasoning are all descriptions that are meant to be equally good complete
descriptions, of all the facts. Treating invariance amongst arbitrary incomplete
representations as a guide to reality would be quite disastrous, as any unmentioned
feature would be filtered out in this way. On the other hand, if the varying
descriptions are indeed equally good complete descriptions, then it simply follows
that any remaining differences amongst them must indeed be merely conventional
differences in the ways we describe the world, otherwise any such description would
not be complete.
For the fragmentalist, a complete description of some physical system is a
description of the system in all the different fragments, of its total perspectival
manifestation. We should sharply distinguish between what is variant across the
frame descriptions within a single collection (i.e. across fragments) and what is
variant across the total collection of such descriptions (i.e. across total represen-
tations of the overall fragmented world). Even on the fragmentalist view, there is the
standardly presumed connection between reality and invariance across equally good
complete representations of some isolated system. The fragmentalist is not denying
this connection between variance amongst complete descriptions and mere ways of
3 This is not quite the description that Fine would give. For reasons that we cannot go into, Fine believes
that the embedded tensed sentences are not of the simple form ‘the shuttle is at rest’ but rather ‘a token
fact of the shuttle’s being at rest obtains’ (2005: 318).
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describing things, the fragmentalist only denies that descriptions of single fragments
are complete descriptions and hence denies that the variance across fragments is an
instance of variance across equally good complete descriptions. Fragmentalism does
not oppose standard symmetry reasoning. It only implies that the reasoning does not
apply in a case where it is standardly taken to apply. I will continue to speak of
frame-invariant facts and variant properties, even within the fragmentalist picture; I
hope I have said enough to avoid confusion.
3 The explanatory potency of variant properties
Giving that the standard Minkowskian interpretation of the special theory of
relativity is both successful and explains matters in terms of invariant properties
only, does the fragmentalist not introduce a layer of superfluous qualitative
structure, unneeded for the scientific explanation of phenomena? If so, parsimony
considerations will speak strongly against a fragmentalist interpretation. Contrary to
the assumption behind this worry, it turns out that variant properties will naturally
slot into various kinds of physical explanations, due to the fact that they would
themselves exhibit lawlike dynamic behaviour.
The variant properties, if they are indeed instantiated, will themselves be
amongst the properties that are governed by dynamic laws. The variant properties of
things at one time naturally figure in explanations of variant properties at a later
time and so they are not explanatorily redundant. Given that the attribution of
variant properties differs across fragments, and given that dynamic explanations
feature such properties, one and the same phenomenon may be explained in quite
different ways in different fragments.
This is nicely illustrated by the following well-known case (taken from Mermin
2005: 185–186 but originally due to Bell 1976/1987). Imagine that there are two
rockets Rocket I and Rocket II, separated by some spatial distance Dx, with a rope
stretched tightly between them. Say we observe things as follows: Rocket I and
Rocket II are initially at rest and then they start to move in the x direction at the
same time at the same rate, keeping their spatial separation Dx unchanged. As the
rope has gained at this later moment in time a velocity in the x direction, the length
of the tightly strung rope must be contracted. Now imagine that the rope is
contracted beyond its elastic limit and breaks at the moment that the rockets are
moving. Here we explain the breaking of the rope in terms of the contracted length
of the rope and the constant spatial separation between Rocket I and Rocket II. We
thus have an explanation in terms of length contraction.
Things are different from the perspective of a different frame: here Rocket I and
Rocket II are initially moving in the—x direction and then come to a standstill at
which moment the rope breaks. (From our earlier perspective, we say that this is the
perspective of someone initially moving in the x direction). It can be shown that the
moment that Rocket II stops comes before the moment that Rocket I stops, so that
Rocket I continues in the meantime to travel in the—x direction, thereby stretching
the rope until it breaks. Here we explain the breaking of the rope in terms of a
temporary difference in constant velocities between Rocket I and Rocket II, and the
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briefly increasing distance between them. As Mermin points out, ‘the mechanism
that gives the real explanation for a phenomenon in one frame of reference, may be
quite different from the mechanism that gives the real explanation in another’
(2005: 185).
There will be fragment-specific phenomena which can only gain fragment-
specific explanations. To take another simpler case: constant velocities at one time
are naturally involved in explanations of constant velocities at a later time (cf. Sklar
1977: 180, Dasgupta 2016: 846). If in one fragment an object remains at rest, its
being at rest at t1 may be explained by it having being at rest at t0 and its having
being unperturbed by external forces in the time between t0 and t1. Given that the
object’s being at rest is unique to the relevant fragment, it also only receives an
explanation within this fragment.4
The variant properties are certainly not physically redundant within the
fragmentalist conception of space and time, and feature in physical explanations
of phenomena. This can seem puzzling: surely the Minkowski conception, which
enjoys such wide adherence, is not lacking in adequate physical explanations and
yet it does not recognize the instantiation of variant properties, nor explanations
phrased in terms of them. The Minkowskian is indeed not lacking in adequate
explanations, but that is because the Minkowskian does not acknowledge the
phenomena that would stand in need of explanations in terms of variant properties.
Because the Minkowskian denies that an object is really at rest at a given time for
example, she also does not need to explain this in terms of changes in the constant
velocity of the object at a previous time. The Minkowskian only acknowledges
phenomena characterized in terms of spacetime intervals, and she also only needs to
appeal to (changes in) spacetime intervals to explain them. The Minkowskian is thus
not lacking physical explanations when considered on its own terms.
The fragmentalist and Minkowskian differ over what the phenomena are to which
our physics should be held accountable. The fragmentalist admits a richer variation
of phenomena, for example, it distinguishes a case in which two particles are both at
rest from a case in which two particles are both travelling with 5 km/h in the
x direction. If there are indeed such phenomena, it is not just that variant properties
happen to be serviceable in physical explanations, they serve in physical
explanations that could not be given in any other terms. The main issue is thus
whether we should construe the phenomena—the legitimate explananda—as
including perspectival matters or not.
4 Hofweber and Lange on the fragmentalist interpretation
Hofweber and Lange argue that the fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity
is in tension with the proper explanation of why the Lorentz transformations hold
(2017: 871). On the standard interpretation, the Lorentz transformations of the
4 Cf. Sklar: ‘As von Neumann has remarked, the problem with a non-relativistic explanation of the facts
is not that one can’t be given but that too many can be given, and no reason can be given for selecting one
rather than another’ (1977: 280).
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different frame descriptions obtain because of the way in which the same underlying
world is coordinatized in the different frames of reference. Hofweber and Lange
argue that this is the right explanation of why the Lorentz transformations hold and
that the fragmentalist has no room for this explanation.
One preliminary point. I do not agree with the theoretical commitments attributed
to the fragmentalist interpretation in their discussion. Hofweber and Lange assume
that fragmentalism ‘takes frame-dependent facts to be fundamental rather than
derivative from frame-invariant facts such as facts about the spacetime intervals
between various events’ (2017: 874). But nothing that we have seen so far commits
the fragmentalist to this. For one, Fine himself is not committed to the idea that
something is in reality the case if and only if it is not grounded by anything, so two
matters may both be real even when the one grounds the other (2001: 27). Fine’s
notion of ‘reality’ is independent from ‘grounding’. Although grounding may be a
good defeasible guide to what is real, there is no reason why there could not in
principle be some fundamental facts grounding certain other fundamental facts
(presumably, with the relevant grounding facts themselves being fundamental as
well).
In other words, there is nothing in the fragmentalist interpretation that is
incompatible with postulating a Minkowskian spacetime next to the various
fragments and taking the distributions of the variant properties to be grounded in the
spacetime intervals of the Minkowskian spacetime. Such a view does not disagree
with the standard Minkowskian interpretation about the grounds or the explanations
of the variant matters. The Minkowskian takes them to be explanations of mere
appearances, whereas the fragmentalist takes them to be explanations of genuinely
obtaining yet grounded facts. Such a view would only disagree with the
Minkowskian view about the reality of the variant matters.
One might wonder whether there is still a substantive difference between the
Minkowskian view and the current way of developing the fragmentalist account.
What it is the theoretical upshot of the variant matters being ‘real’ in Fine’s sense?
The importance is that of marking a metaphysical realism about those variant
matters. The relevant question is whether realism or antirealism is true about the
frame-relative facts, that is, whether consideration of the special theory of relativity
removes all frame-relative facts from one’s metaphysical conception of reality: the
Minkowskian answers yes, the fragmentalist answers no. There is of course a further
question whether realism is best understood using Fine’s primitive notion of reality
(see Horwich 2007; to which Fine 2007 responds; see also Lipman 2018).
As mentioned briefly in the introduction, alternative formulations of fragmen-
talism, given by Lipman (2015), Loss (2017) and Simon (forthcoming), do not
invoke a primitive notion of ‘reality’ but rather only work with the notion of
coherence, which they prefer to call ‘co-obtainment’. Two facts may obtain without
co-obtaining and this is what the ‘fragmentation’ consists in. On these views, the
debate with the Minkowskian is not whether the frame-relative facts are
fundamental or real facts, as on Fine’s approach, rather, the debate is about
whether they are facts at all. The fragmentalist believes that it can be a genuine fact
that a piece of paper is square and a genuine fact that it is oblong, whereas the
Minkowskian needs to say that the piece of paper does not have such a property but
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only seems to, given a certain frame-relative description. If grounding is assumed to
be factive, the Minkowskian cannot be claiming that the frame-relative facts are
themselves grounded in the spacetime interval (i.e. they cannot claim that it is the
paper’s being square that is grounded in the interval), as this would imply that there
are genuine frame-relative facts (i.e. that the paper is genuinely square and hence
that there is the purely spatial property of being square). If there are such genuine
frame-relative facts, this raises the question whether we should privilege one frame
or accept the mutually incompatible facts of multiple frames. Neither of these
options are typically taken to be live options for the Minkowskian view. Instead, the
Minkowskian must be saying that, strictly speaking, it is only the mere appearance
of frame-relative facts that is grounded in spacetime intervals. Though the
Minkowskian and the current type of fragmentalist disagree about the exact nature
of the explananda, they agree about the standard direction of explanation, both
taking the spacetime interval to ground the variant matters (or, according to the
Minkowskian, the appearances thereof).
The complaint that the fragmentalist interpretation conflicts with the right
explanations of the Lorentz transformations is therefore somewhat off the mark: the
objection targets something that is not really an essential commitment of the view,
namely a claim about the direction of explanation. The fragmentalist can in
principle adopt whatever direction of explanation the Minkowskian appeals to.
Having said this, Hofweber and Lange’s objection is interesting and it is worth
considering the sort of fragmentalist view it does target. Let us therefore imagine a
fragmentalist who believes: (1) that the variant properties are real, and (2) that the
spacetime intervals consist in constant ratios of variant properties, and (3) that the
variant properties—the different spatial and temporal distances in different
frames—ground such ratios. The invariant intervals are the unified appearances of
a fundamentally fragmented world on this way of developing the fragmentalist
interpretation. The Lorentz transformations of the coordinate frames underwrite the
law-governed regularity between the distributions of fundamental yet variant
properties in the different fragments. It is this sort of view that Hofweber and Lange
criticize and it is a grounding story that might indeed appeal to the fragmentalist.
For the remainder of this section, the fragmentalist interpretation under discussion
will be the one just outlined.
Both the Minkowskian and the fragmentalist agree that the Lorentz transforma-
tions hold and that the spacetime interval is invariant. Hofweber and Lange claim
that the invariance of the interval is generally assumed to explain the Lorentz
transformations (2017: 876). The assumed explanatory priority of the spacetime
interval, they argue, is naturally explained by the standard interpretation of the
special theory of relativity:
Why does the spacetime interval’s invariance count as explanatorily prior to
various other facts, such as the transformation laws? After all, the transfor-
mation laws suffice to entail the spacetime interval’s invariance. Why does
science take the direction of explanation as running from the spacetime
interval’s invariance to the transformation laws rather than, say, in the reverse
direction? Because the spacetime interval, as a frame-invariant fact, is the
M. A. Lipman
123
reality, whereas the facts related by the coordinate transformations are frame-
dependent facts and hence are appearances of that reality. How things are
explains how things appear from a given perspective. Therefore, the law that a
certain quantity is invariant takes explanatory priority over the laws specifying
how various frame-dependent quantities transform (2017: 876).
Starting from the Lorentz transformations plus supplementary assumptions, we can
derive the invariance of the spacetime interval. In the other direction, so starting
from the invariance of the spacetime interval plus supplementary assumptions, we
can derive that the Lorentz transformations hold. About all of this, the Minkowskian
and fragmentalist can agree.
Nevertheless, it is standardly assumed that the explanatory direction runs from
the invariance of the spacetime interval to the Lorentz transformations. Hofweber
and Lange suggest in the cited passage that this is because the spacetime interval is
real and the variant properties mere appearances. The fragmentalist interpretation
under discussion, which takes the variant properties to be real and the grounds for
the spacetime interval, cannot offer the standard explanation. The standard
interpretation underwrites the standardly assumed explanatory priority of the
spacetime interval, whereas the fragmentalist conflicts with it.
It is unclear what the exact dialectical significance is of this point. We can
discern two distinct criticisms. First there is the claim that the invariance of the
interval is widely assumed to have explanatory priority within the scientific
community. This should be distinguished from the claim that the invariance of the
interval indeed has explanatory priority. The first is a sociological claim about,
roughly, the assumptions at play in the scientific community; the second is a claim
about which fact indeed takes explanatory priority. Let us consider these points in
turn.
First there is the claim that the invariance of the spacetime interval is generally
assumed to take explanatory priority. Hofweber and Lange offer various quotes (by
Eddington, Mermin, Einstein and Holton) which express adherence either to the
standard interpretation or to the basic assumption that different perspectives always
present us with mere appearances of an underlying unified reality (2017: 874). This
assumption—of taking reality to be unified behind the mere perspectival appear-
ances—they claim is ‘alien to the spirit behind fragmentalism’ (2017: 877). Let us
grant that this is so. What to make of this? One might here raise the methodological
principle that in any disagreement between the views of scientists and metaphysi-
cians, we ought to favour the views of the scientists, given that science is on a much
firmer epistemological footing. Though we should all adhere to this methodological
principle, it has to be wielded with care. The scientist’s views are authoritative
because the scientific method has proven to be the best means of furthering
knowledge. The epistemological deference to science is based on the methodolog-
ical superiority of the scientific method, and hence the principle of ‘favoring the
scientist’s views’ should clearly be restricted to only those matters that can be
decided on the basis of those scientific methods—that is, to the empirical claims.
The scientific method only provides the scientist with an authority over empirical
matters. The fragmentalist does not question the special theory of relativity, the
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transformation laws, or any of the empirical evidence that supports them. There is
no disagreement about the science itself. The debate is about the proper
metaphysical interpretation of the relevant science: about how best to conceive of
the world so as to accommodate the scientific facts. This is not decided by the
standard empirical methods (if only we could), but on the basis of simplicity,
plausibility, the ability to integrate with further theories, the ability to save the
appearances, and so on. These methods are not a firmer footing than those of the
metaphysician, in fact they arguably are amongst the methods of the metaphysician.
There is no good basis for deferring to the views of scientists on these abstract and
non-empirical matters.
Against this response, one might argue that we ought to adopt a more far-
reaching naturalism on which we philosophers ought to adopt whatever views are
congenial to current scientific practice, even on matters that lie beyond empirical
matters. Physicists explain variant matters on the basis of invariant matters, and
would it not obstruct science if fragmentalism demands a change in the current
scientific practice?5 Ultimately, current practice ought to conform to whatever turns
out to be the most reasonable overall view of the world. The sensible fragmentalist
metaphysician is not currently suggesting to overthrow current scientific practice,
she is just showing that there is a coherent alternative to the standard interpretation
and exploring its advantages. If the case for the standard interpretation remains
stronger than the fragmentalist alternative, then this is reason enough to dismiss the
fragmentalist interpretation. If there turn out to be major advantages to the
fragmentalist interpretation over the standard interpretation, then it also would not
obstruct science to change current practice, on the contrary. Either way, appeal to
scientific practice at the current stage of investigation strikes me as a red herring.
There is another way of understanding the complaint that fragmentalism goes
against general assumptions of the scientific community. The point may simply be
that fragmentalism is a revisionary view and that this counts in favour of the
standard interpretation, as the standard view has earned its credits and demonstrated
it can provide an understanding of matters. Fragmentalism is indeed a revisionary
view and this is indeed a comparative cost. This goes without saying. Further work
will clarify how revisionary it is and whether advantages offset it. There are also
distinctions to be made. The fragmentalist approach sketched earlier, which
maintains explanations in terms of a fundamental Minkowskian spacetime, is less
revisionary than the fragmentalist view currently under discussion, which also
reverses the order of explanation. This may be a point in favour of the weaker
approach, but not nearly a decisive point.
Let us turn instead to the endorsement of the standard explanatory direction.
Hofweber and Lange claim that the standard assumption is right and that the
invariance of the interval has indeed explanatory priority.6 They write that the
interval must be what explains Lorentz transformations ‘because the spacetime
5 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing the naturalist underpinnings of the objection.
6 I assume that the notion of explanation here is not merely epistemological, but something that is meant
to reflect a certain objective explanatory order in the world.
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interval, as a frame-invariant fact, is the reality, whereas the facts related by the
coordinate transformations are frame-dependent facts and hence are appearances of
that reality’ (2017: 876). This is not an argument but the direct denial of
fragmentalism, which just is the view that the frame-relative facts are real and not
the mere appearances of frame-invariant facts.
Hofweber and Lange argue that the fragmentalist needs to postulate ‘brute’
connections across the fragments without giving any reason to expect such brute
connections, and that this is a substantive cost of the view (2017: 878). The relevant
question here, I take it, is this: why are there only ever fragments related to each
other in accord with the Lorentz transformations, and no other fragments? The
answer is that there are the Lorentz ‘laws’ relating the fragments. There is no further
explanation of why these laws hold. The Minkowskian, in contrast, explains the
Lorentz transformations, according to this objection.
That the lawlike-connections underwriting the Lorentz transformations take
explanatory priority over the spacetime interval (and assumed variance of the
variant properties) does not mean that there cannot be another explanation of the
Lorentz transformations. One might offer an account along general Humean lines,
for example, or one might endorse a so-called dynamical explanation of the Lorentz
transformations, according to which transformations are taken to be grounded in the
various forces acting on rods and clocks (Bell 1976/1987; Brown and Pooley 2006;
and Brown 2005). Such explanations are not incompatible with fragmentalism (or
the theory of special relativity, more generally).
If such explanations are not to be had, however, then there will indeed be a brute
constraint on the distribution of variant properties, but if this is how things turn out,
this type of brute constraint arises in some form for any view that does justice to the
special theory of relativity. The constraint that the fragmentalist needs to impose on
the fragments is effectively that light must have the constant velocity c, regardless
of the state of motion of the emitting body, in any fragment. This is just the
postulate of the invariant velocity of light. The Minkowskian captures this
invariance of the speed of light in inertial reference frames in terms of the geometric
structure imposed on spacetime (together with the way this is projected onto inertial
frames). But that this constraint is incorporated as a geometric law of spacetime
does not mean that it is somehow less brute. Why does spacetime have the
Minkowski structure as opposed to a geometric structure that allows objects to move
faster than the speed of light? The Minkowskian answer is that it just does. This is
entirely fair. The fragmentalist’s postulation of the invariance of the velocity of light
as a basic physical law is however no less fair.
One might think that the worry concerns not the brute imposition of the
invariance of the speed of light, but rather the fact that the Minkowskian can explain
why events have the variant properties that are attributed to them in a given frame.
The Minkowskian explains variant properties in terms of the intervals of those
events. The fragmentalist view under discussion takes the instantiations of the
variant properties to be basic, and not to be the mere appearance of underlying
properties. But that is only half of the story. This type of fragmentalism was
characterized by the further idea that we can explain why the events have the
spacetime intervals in terms of the variant properties of those events, in contrast to
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the Minkowskian view, on which the distribution of spacetime intervals are taken to
be basic. Where two views differ in what grounds what, bruteness will emerge in
different places. In such cases, our evaluation goes astray if we merely point out that
a certain matter is brute on one view and not brute on the other.
Hofweber and Lange do not succeed in raising any serious problem for the
fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity. It remains a live option, worthy of
further investigation.
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